Message posted by Duke on October 10, 2019 at 15:49:26 PST:
Sounds like our backgrounds are very similar. Like you, I worked DoD (USAF) programs with technology that left ME in awe, let along others. The difference, though, was the stuff I saw I knew came from Pico, Palmdale, Burbank, and San Diego; nothing from the Pleiades or Alpha Centauri. Aside from having lied about such things as his education and employment history, Lazar's stories (when they don't change) about working at S4 are immediately identifiable as bogus to those who've worked in the black world. For example, he's talked about how overly restrictive and compartmentalized security was at S4, but then said all nine hanger bays where the alien craft were maintained were open so he could and did clearly see all nine craft. Remember, his story was he was recruited only to work on "the sports model," he admits he wasn't accessed to any of the other craft. Not only does this contradict his comments about the rigid departmentalization of the individual craft, but makes no sense from a real world program security standpoint. To illustrate the point, consider the various a/c that were being flown at A51 in my time from the mid 80s through the early 90s. Sequestering those not accessed to a specific a/c during ground/flight testing of that a/c was standard procedure until the a/c was buttoned back up in its secure facility. There is no practical reason to think such a procedure would not have been followed if the facility/craft Lazar claims to have knowledge of did exist. As anyone who's ever worked in that environment can will you, security processes and procedures are not left to chance. All such (USAF) facilities operate under common established, mandatory security AFIs, OIs, procedures, regulations, plans etc across the board. (Not surprisingly, many of the documents defining security requirements/methods are themselves classified.) It is against these common, standardized requirements/documents that organizations are evaluated during IG compliance/readiness/security inspections. The concept and processes of compartmentalization implementation are well established, non-accessed personnel wouldn't even know the designation/nomenclature of a program they were not cleared into, let alone have an opportunity to freely and randomly observe the classified systems associated with that program.
In Reply to: Re: BOB LAZAR posted by EngineerGuY on October 10, 2019 at 10:34:20 PST:
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